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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
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VOLUME 95 NOVEMBER 30, 2009 PAGES 67-77 
RESPONSE 
TIERED ORIGINALITY AND THE DUALISM OF COPYRIGHT 
INCENTIVES 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh*
N a well argued and thought-provoking new article, Gideon 
Parchomovsky and Alex Stein attempt to give copyright’s requirement 
of originality real meaning, by connecting it to the system’s avowed 
institutional goals.1 To this end, they focus on disaggregating originality 
into three tiers and providing creative works within each tier with a 
different set of rights and liabilities. Parchomovsky and Stein are indeed 
correct to lament the meaninglessness of originality under current 
copyright doctrine. Yet their proposal does not quite fully explore the 
incentive effects of differentiated originality, especially as between 
upstream and downstream creators. Nor does it tell us why some of 
copyright’s more recent innovations are not the right place to give effect 
to their ideas and principles. In this Response, I examine how their 
refashioned originality doctrine might fit within copyright’s incentive 
structure, and in the process ask whether there might be better ways of 
integrating it into the institution’s existing common law structure. 
I 
I.ORIGINALITY AND THE INCENTIVE TO BE CREATIVE 
Copyright’s principal normative justification today is utilitarian. 
Deriving from the Constitution’s emphasis on “Progress” and the 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to 
Gideon Parchomovsky for comments and helpful discussions. 
1 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505 (2009). 
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promotion of “Science and useful Arts,”2 courts, scholars, and 
policymakers today contend that copyright exists primarily as an 
incentive for authors to produce and disseminate their creations to the 
public.3 Through the promise of limited exclusionary control over their 
expressive creations, the system induces the very production of such 
expression. Or so the theory tells us. 
Parchomovsky and Stein seem to accept copyright’s utilitarian 
substructure, and their originality proposal attempts to situate itself 
within this framework.4 A differentiated originality regime, they 
contend, will encourage creators to generate more creative (that is, more 
original) works, thereby producing greater net social welfare.5 In so 
arguing, they take as a given a direct relationship between originality 
and aggregate social benefit. 
Parchomovsky and Stein focus their attention on one of several costs 
normally associated with the copyright system: the cost to future 
creators who seek to make use of prior creations⎯also referred to as 
copyright’s dynamic inefficiency.6 And it is here that the 
Parchomovsky-Stein model makes a very important contribution to 
copyright theory. In its traditional formulation, copyright’s theory of 
incentives focuses entirely on providing creators with an incentive to 
create, measured in terms of the scope and extent of its grant of 
exclusivity. Propertarian tendencies that today dominate the field tend to 
view it as analogous to a standard property interest (excepting of course 
the deadweight losses that come as a consequence of the nonrival nature 
of its subject matter) that operates against the world at large, that is, in 
rem. This tends to neglect the reality that copyright, unlike standard 
property interests, and in contrast to its closest cousin, patent law, is a 
bipolar entitlement⎯where the plaintiff’s entitlement is defined entirely 
by reference to a defendant’s actions. In other words, the existence and 
scope of the entitlement are always determined in a bilateral setting, 
during a trial for infringement. It is a defendant’s (potential freerider’s) 
actions that necessitate legal validation and enforcement of the 
2 See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3 For an overview of copyright’s incentives in theory and as applied, see Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1577–81 
(2009). 
4 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1508, 1517. 
5 Id. at 1517 (“[O]nly original works promote social welfare . . . .”). 
6 See id. at 1515. For an overview of this phenomenon, see Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of 
Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 36–37 (2006). 
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entitlement through the system of copyright. In this sense then, 
copyright law tends to resemble traditional common law entitlements 
(such as those in tort and unjust enrichment), rather than property rights 
that derive from tangible resources.7
Note that the traditional theory of copyright incentives focuses 
entirely on the incentive effects on one side of the bilateral equation in 
which the interest fructifies. In other words, copyright’s incentive 
framework is thought to relate exclusively to a plaintiff-creator via the 
exclusionary rights that it grants him or her. This ignores the reality that 
copyright’s incentive effects can and do affect actual and potential 
defendants, that is, copyists. Given the reality that most creativity today 
is sequential and builds on work from the past, copyright law’s 
commitment to inducing creativity necessitates examining its effects on 
creative borrowing as well.8 Today’s plaintiff-creators are thus very 
likely tomorrow’s defendant-copyists and vice-versa, a reality that the 
traditional theory of incentives is hard-placed to accommodate.9 
Copyright therefore creates two separate inducements, one upstream and 
the other downstream. The former consists of its promise of limited 
market exclusivity, or “rights-incentive,” while the latter consists 
primarily of its reduction or elimination of liability for infringement for 
certain kinds of copying, best described as its “immunity-incentive.” 
Thus if copyright is to concern itself with creativity of both 
kinds⎯upstream creativity and downstream (sequential) creativity⎯it 
needs to strike the right balance between both kinds of incentives, for a 
reduction in one operates as an expansion of the other. 
The Parchomovsky-Stein model of differentiated originality is then 
best understood as an attempt to balance copyright’s upstream incentive 
with its downstream incentive. Their focus on the importance of the 
latter category is well borne out by recent studies that seem to indicate 
that downstream creators are risk-averse and tend to be deterred from 
creative borrowing, even when such borrowing may be legitimate as a 
matter of law.10
7 I have elaborated on this argument in previous work. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 1126, 1162 (2009). 
8 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 (1990) 
(noting how all creativity is, in part, derivative). 
9 See Benkler, supra note 6, at 37–38. 
10 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 
116 Yale L.J. 882, 887–906 (2007). 
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Their model proposes three tiers of originality under which a 
defendant’s liability for copying is assessed.11 The first tier, the 
“doctrine of inequivalents,” is restricted to situations where a copier 
borrows from a protected work, but in the process injects a high level of 
originality and creativity into the final product.12 In this situation, the 
model immunizes the copier from suits for copyright infringement 
altogether.13 To be entitled to this immunity though, it appears that the 
copyist’s work needs to be significantly more than just minimally 
original. Yet Parchomovsky and Stein nowhere tell us how this 
threshold is to be assessed, beyond describing it as “exceptional.”14 
Furthermore, even assuming that courts will be able to work this 
standard pure, as they have others, it is not clear why the authors apply it 
exclusively to the downstream incentive side of the copyright equation, 
and not the upstream side. A core intuition underlying their proposal is 
that copyright law treats works of differential creativity similarly, which 
is both inefficient and unfair.15 If their proposal is directed at remedying 
this unfairness, shouldn’t it apply to both upstream and downstream 
creativity? More specifically, why shouldn’t an independent (as opposed 
to borrowing) creator whose creativity is deemed exceptional by the 
same standards that they propose be entitled to something more than a 
creator whose work does not meet such standards? Or put another way, 
shouldn’t a less creative work get less exclusionary protection than an 
exceptionally creative one? 
Consider the following example involving two artists, A and B. A’s 
work is path-breaking, does not involve any borrowing at all from 
previous works, and is exceptionally creative; while B’s work does not 
meet the same creativity standard. A decade after A and B create their 
works, there come along two new artists, Y and Z. Here, while Y’s work 
borrows from A’s and B’s works very heavily, it is nonetheless very 
creative and introduces new techniques. Z’s work borrows from A and B 
similarly, but does so with significantly less creativity than Y’s work. 
(Let us also assume that Z’s work is less original than is B’s). Now 
consider the working of the doctrine of inequivalents as between these 
four artists. Against Z, A and B have similar (if not identical) rights: A’s 
11 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1507–08. 
12 Id. at 1525–26. 
13 Id. at 1525. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1506. 
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additional creativity has no place here. Against Y, neither A nor B has 
any claim, as a consequence of the doctrine of inequivalents. In sum, A 
and B come to be treated exactly the same, even though one is 
exceptionally creative and the other is not, even as against a defendant 
who is entitled to no immunity under the doctrine. What incentive, then, 
would A have to be any more creative than B? If the idea behind the 
proposal was to generate an incentive to be creative, on the assumption 
that creativity corresponds linearly to social welfare, the proposal here 
appears incomplete.16
The added-value doctrine, the model’s second tier of originality, 
compares the creativity of the parties when the defendant’s work does 
not qualify for the doctrine of inequivalents.17 In situations where the 
original work is more creative, the plaintiff is entitled to seek injunctive 
relief. If not, she must be satisfied with damages.18 In our hypothetical, 
both A and B can seek injunctive relief against Z. The fact that A’s 
creativity exceeded B’s⎯or that the difference between A’s originality 
and Z’s was vastly in excess of the difference between B’s originality 
and Z’s⎯is of little consequence. Again, the model’s focus on the 
downstream incentive comports well with its premise on the connection 
between creativity and social welfare, but its failure to differentiate 
between levels of creativity on the rights-incentive side remains 
conspicuous. 
The model’s third tier of originality, the sameness doctrine, attempts 
to focus on the upstream incentive side of the balance by deterring 
copiers who borrow from protected works with little to no originality of 
their own.19 It builds on copyright’s striking similarity rule and 
presumes the existence of infringement, which the defendant is then 
called upon to rebut. While this rule may have been intended to 
compensate for the defendant focus of the other two rules,20 in reality it 
is likely to do no more than deter low-originality copying by a 
defendant. To a creator, it has little independent effect on the ex ante 
incentive to create a work of high creativity. In other words, while it 
16 Id. at 1508 (“[O]ur framework will encourage creators to focus on the original content 
of their works and thereby enhance their contributions to society.”). 
17 Id. at 1533. 
18 Id. at 1533–34. 
19 Id. at 1542. 
20 Id. at 1542–43 (“The rule’s secondary purpose is to strengthen the copyright protection 
of original creators . . . .”). 
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may serve to reduce less socially beneficial (that is, low-originality) 
creations, it does little to actually induce the production of work likely to 
generate greater social welfare (that is, high-originality). 
The net incentive effects of the three tiers of the Parchomovsky-Stein 
model are best illustrated in the table below. 
 
Level of 
Originality 
Rule Upstream 
Incentive 
Downstream 
Incentive 
Exceptional Doctrine of 
Inequivalents 
None Positive 
Relative Added-
Value Doctrine 
Positive Positive 
Low Doctrine of 
Sameness 
None Negative 
 
As should be apparent, the model’s primary focus remains on 
downstream creativity. This focus will affect copyright’s immunity 
incentive, thereby promoting certain kinds of socially beneficial copying 
(or borrowing) and deter others when socially suboptimal. Yet it does 
little by way of affecting copyright’s ex ante incentive to create on the 
traditional rights side, through copyright’s grant of exclusivity. By 
failing to calibrate an independent creator’s entitlement to the extent of 
the creative contribution in any meaningful way, the model opens itself 
to objections of incompleteness and the likelihood of generating a 
distortionary effect on copyright’s current (even if incomplete) balance 
between upstream and downstream creativity. 
It may well be that Parchomovsky and Stein believe that copyright’s 
current overbreadth provides upstream, independent creators with 
sufficient protection so as to not warrant any further modifications to 
copyright’s upstream incentive. Alternatively, they may believe that 
copyright’s other rules⎯such as the second fair use factor21⎯do enough 
already to disaggregate upstream works based on their creativity, or 
indeed that all upstream creativity involves some amount of borrowing, 
such that the downstream incentive suffices as an inducement in the 
aggregate. If any of these options is indeed the case, the model would 
benefit from elaborating on these assumptions. 
 
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006) (requiring courts to look to “the nature of the copyrighted 
work” as part of the fair use analysis). 
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II. TRANSFORMATIVE USE AND THIN COPYRIGHT 
Parchomovsky and Stein are no doubt correct that copyright’s 
originality requirement, insofar as it is intended to operate as a filter, is 
somewhat vacuous. Yet their model seems to pay insufficient attention 
to the two areas where courts have, over the last two decades, come to 
use creativity as a basis by which to modulate copyright’s entitlement 
and liability structure. These are the doctrines of transformative use and 
thin copyright protection. Might a refinement and combination of these 
two doctrines achieve the same result as the authors’ proposals? 
A.Transformative Use 
Adopted by the Supreme Court in 1994, the transformative-use 
variant of the fair use doctrine immunizes a defendant from liability for 
infringement if the defendant’s work “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”22 In the years since its adoption, the 
doctrine has come to be applied with great frequency by courts at 
different levels. And in almost all instances, the principal focus of the 
inquiry remains the defendant’s creative contribution to his or her use of 
the work.23
Thus, in situations where the defendant uses the work by modifying it 
significantly, alters its presentation and content, develops it for an 
altogether different market, or parodies it, courts have been ready to 
exempt the defendant from a finding of infringement altogether. Indeed, 
recent interpretations of the doctrine even seem to go so far as to 
conclude that a defendant need not actually alter the underlying 
expression in a work to make a transformative use of it.24
To be sure, there exists a good deal of vagueness underlying the very 
idea of “transformative”—a vagueness that courts have from time to 
time struggled to make sense of in individual cases. Yet few seem to 
22 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
23 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251–53 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269–71 
(11th Cir. 2001); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
24 See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638–40 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
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believe that the doctrine ought to be abolished altogether. Indeed, many 
consider the doctrine to be copyright’s most important safety valve for 
downstream creativity.25
Parchomovsky and Stein acknowledge that courts currently use the 
idea of “transformativeness” to examine the originality and creativity of 
a work.26 Yet, in their actual model, they say little about how their new 
doctrines will interface with the functioning of transformative use. Since 
they do not seem to advocate its retrenchment, they would leave courts 
to undertake a similar analysis as part of two different doctrines, which 
would surely be inefficient and redundant. Additionally, some of what 
their model proposes is currently, or has been proposed to be, part of the 
transformative use analysis.27
Recasting transformative use as a doctrine of comparative 
creativity⎯involving a comparison of a plaintiff’s and a defendant’s 
works through the lens of their respective creative contributions⎯may 
achieve several of the goals underlying the Parchomovsky-Stein model. 
In situations where a defendant borrows from a plaintiff’s work, but in 
the process adds significantly to it in terms of creativity, the current 
version of transformative use exempts the defendant altogether from 
liability for infringement. If this binary transformative/non-
transformative classification were modified, and replaced in large part 
by a system of mandatory compensation for transformative uses under 
which a defendant were made to pay the original author for the creative 
content borrowed (rather than exempted altogether), it would begin to 
resemble the model’s “added-value doctrine.” Indeed, one might further 
tweak the transformative use regime by requiring that courts refrain 
from granting injunctive relief whenever a “reasonable contention” of 
transformative use is made, as others—most recently Neil Netanel—
have advocated.28 Under this regime, an injunction would be an option 
25 See Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 19 (1994) (arguing that in Campbell the Court effectively rescued 
the fair use doctrine). 
26 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1523. 
27 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 
112 Yale L.J. 1, 55–58 (2002) (advocating a “profit allocation” remedy for uses that build on 
prior works). 
28 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 190–93 (2008). The “reasonable 
contention” idea derives from the Court’s description of the transformative use doctrine in 
Campbell. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10. Campbell in turn relied on Judge Leval’s article 
for the point. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 
1132, 1134 (1990). 
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only when the defendant’s claim of transformative use is plainly 
unreasonable, that is, in situations where the defendant’s own creative 
contribution to the final work is negligible. 
This leaves us with the model’s attempt to “immunize” exceptional 
creativity from all suits for infringement through the doctrine of 
inequivalents.29 Parchomovsky and Stein are not very clear on how this 
immunity would operate, especially in contrast to the fair use doctrine. 
As noted earlier, liability for copyright infringement and the very 
subsistence of copyright in a given work are only ever determined 
bilaterally, in the context of a suit. If by “immunity” they mean a finding 
of no infringement, this begins to resemble precisely what fair use 
purports to do, even though courts often describe it as a “defense” to 
infringement. The Copyright Act explicitly notes that a fair use is not an 
instance of infringement at all,30 thus distinguishing it from other 
exceptions such as the “de minimis” rule. If the transformative use 
doctrine’s original binary formula were retained for a narrow set of 
creative works⎯such as those that “ha[ve] an obvious claim to 
transformative value,” to use the Supreme Court’s language31⎯and 
upon such a finding, courts were to exempt the work from infringement 
altogether, the result would be a rule analogous to the doctrine of 
inequivalents. 
B. Thin and Thick Copyright Protection 
A modified transformative use regime such as the one described 
above, however, still does not solve the problem identified earlier, 
namely, the Parchomovsky-Stein model’s failure to disaggregate 
copyright’s upstream and downstream incentives. If, as they describe, 
social welfare is indeed maximized by works of greater creativity (rather 
than mere numerosity), the system ought to provide a greater 
inducement for such works. An option might lie in expanding 
copyright’s rule of “thin” protection. 
The doctrine of thin protection requires that for works with an 
extremely low level of originality—such as those that borrow 
extensively from the public domain—protection remain “thin,” and that 
29 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1525. 
30 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement 
of copyright.”) (emphasis added). 
31 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (noting how a parody fits this category). 
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an action for infringement be permitted only if a plaintiff can establish 
“virtually identical copying.”32 This is, of course, different from the 
doctrine of striking similarity that the authors build upon in their 
sameness rule. In the two decades since its origins, the doctrine has 
grown a fair bit, with courts today extending it to works other than mere 
compilations or collections.33 Could this perhaps be used to disaggregate 
copyright’s upstream incentive further, to maximize social welfare 
originating in creativity? 
One could imagine a sliding scale of creativity—along the lines that 
Parchomovsky and Stein propose—coupled with a rule that alters what 
is considered “copying” based on where on the spectrum a particular 
work’s creative contribution lies. Works of exceptional creativity would 
have a broader entitlement, perhaps extending to the “total concept and 
feel” test for substantial similarity,34 while those of average creativity 
would have a shorter leash, and those of very low originality would be 
relegated to having to show “virtually identical copying” for 
infringement to lie. 
While this approach resembles the sameness rule, it also differs from 
it significantly. For one, it does more than just deter low-originality 
copying by introducing an evidentiary presumption of prima facie 
infringement. It signals to upstream creators that the extent of creativity 
reflected in their work will influence the scope of their rights bundle, in 
much the same way as the modified transformative use doctrine would 
signal a potential variation in their immunity from liability to 
downstream creators. The net result would be that creators know ex ante 
that differing levels of creativity (measured perhaps by the extensiveness 
and nature of their borrowing) will influence the scope of their rights 
bundle, ideally encouraging the production of more works of high-
originality, and fewer ones of medium- to low-originality. 
32 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (establishing 
the idea of “thin” copyright); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 
(9th Cir. 1994) (describing the idea of “virtually identical copying”); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy 
Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the rule). 
33 See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (extending doctrine to 
sculptures). 
34 See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §13.03[A][1][c] 
(2009) (describing and critiquing expansiveness of the test). 
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CONCLUSION 
In attempting to show that the ideas central to the Parchomovsky-
Stein proposal can perhaps be accommodated under current copyright 
doctrine, my claim certainly is not that current copyright law already 
does what the authors claim their model will. I merely suggest that there 
might be good reason to introduce these ideas from within the system if 
possible, rather than from outside. In previous work, I have argued that 
copyright ought to be conceptualized as a common law entitlement and 
that courts should take their job as copyright rulemakers seriously.35 The 
two devices that I identify as possible avenues here, via which the idea 
of tiered originality can be effectuated, represent perhaps two of 
copyright’s most notable judicial innovations in recent times. They lend 
themselves well to the classical common law method of incrementalism 
and to the pragmatic rule development that copyright law ought to adopt. 
Integrating these ideas into the system, rather than overwhelming it with 
a new set of concepts and devices, might thus serve to further this 
process and perhaps reintroduce some semblance of coherence to a 
normatively fragmented institution. 
The idea of downstream incentives is certainly one to which copyright 
law and theory ought to pay closer attention, and Parchomovsky and 
Stein are right to focus their attention on the general neglect of this 
phenomenon. Whether it merits a wholesale overhaul of the entire 
system—including an unclear role for the fair use doctrine—I remain 
unsure. 
 
35 See Balganesh, supra note 7, at 1162. 
